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Abstract—In a spoofing attack, the attacker creates
misleading context in order to trick the victim into making
an inappropriate security-relevant decision.  A spoofing
attack is like a con game: the attacker sets up a false but
convincing world around the victim.  The victim does
something that would be appropriate if the false world
were real.  Unfortunately, activities that seem reasonable
in the false world may have disastrous effects in the real
world. Spoofing attacks are possible in the physical world
as well as the electronic one.  For example, there have been
several incidents in which criminals set up bogus
automated-teller machines (ATM), typically in the public
areas of shopping malls.   The machines would accept
ATM cards and ask the person to enter their PIN code.
Once the machine had the victim’s PIN, it could either eat
the card or “malfunction” and return the card.  In either
case, the criminals had enough information to copy the
victim’s card and use the duplicate.  In these attacks,
people were fooled by the context they saw: the location of
the machines, their size and weight, the way they were
decorated, and the appearance of their electronic displays.
In this Research we discus spoofing attacks and detection
methods of spoofing attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Packets sent using the IP protocol [15] include
the IP address of the sending host. The recipient directs
replies to the sender using this source address. However,
the correctness of this address is not verified by the
protocol. The IP protocol specifies no method for
validating the authenticity of the packet’s source. This
implies that an attacker could forge the source address to
be any he desires. This is a well-known problem and has
been well described [5][10][12]. In all but a few rare
cases, sending spoofed packets is done for illegitimate
purposes. Sending IP packets with forged source
addresses is known as packet spoofing and is used by
attackers for several purposes. These include obscuring
the true source of the attack, implicating another site as
the attack origin, pretending to be a trusted host,
hijacking or intercepting network traffic, or causing
replies to target another system.
Because none of these are desirable, it is useful to
determine if a packet has a spoofed source address. In
cases where an ongoing attack is occurring it is
beneficial to determine if the attack is from a particular
location. In many cases we are able to determine when
packets are spoofed, and generally from where they
originate. Spoofing of network traffic can occur at many
layers. Examples include network layer spoofing (e.g.
Ethernet MAC spoofing), non-IP transport layer
spoofing (e.g. IPX, NetBEUI), as well as session and
application layer spoofing (e.g. email spoofing). All of
these have significant security concerns. However, for
the purposes of this paper we will focus only IP packet
spoofing. A related issue is attacks that cause packets to
be routed to a different host than the sender intends.
These are attacks on routing [9] and the DNS system
[4]. Packet spoofing is restricted to false source
addresses in the IP packet header. This paper discusses a
variety of methods that can help determine if received
packets have spoofed source addresses. Routing-based
methods rely on routers and other network devices to
identify traffic with unexpected source addresses or can
aid spoofed packet detection. Non routing methods
include both active and passive techniques a host can
use to determine if a received packet is spoofed. Active
methods involve either probe, such that the response
will corroborate the authenticity of a received packet, or
methods that cause changes in network behavior such
that the observed change (or lack of change) can
corroborate the authenticity of the packets. Passive
methods involve observing packet data that would be
anomalous in legitimate packets. These methods are not
intended to function in isolation, rather to provide
supplemental information to other IDS components or to
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help assess the significance of far too common nuisance
alerts generated by commercial IDSs. Spoofed packet
detection is an example of techniques to provide
supplemental information to corroborate other IDS
reports when needed.
II. . PACKET SPOOFINGATTACKS
Because packet spoofing can be part of many different
types of attacks, it is important to have an
understanding of how they are used. A key factor in all
packet-spoofing attacks is that it is not necessary for
the attacker to directly receive packet replies from the
target. Replies are either unimportant, their contents
can be inferred, or the packets can be observed in
transit. This section describes several such attacks and
discusses their security implications.
Man–in-the-middle: packet sniffs on link between the
two endpoints, and can pretend to be one end of the
connection
Routing re-direct: redirects routing information from
the original host to the hacker’s host (a variation on the
man-in the-middle attack)
Source routing: redirects individual packets by the
hacker’s host Blind spoofing: predicts responses from a
host, allowing commands to be sent, but does not get
immediate feedback
Flooding; SYN flood fills up the receive queue from
random source addresses; smurf/fraggle spoofs victims
address, causing everyone to respond to the victim.
A. SYN-flood
A SYN flood works by establishing half-open
connections to a node. When the target receives a SYN
packet to an open port, the target will respond with a
SYN-ACK and try to establish a connection. However,
during a SYN flood, the three-way handshake never
completes because the client never responds to the
server’s SYN-ACK. As a result, these “connections”
remain in the half-open state until they time out.
Imagine this process occurring several thousand times
per second. Soon, the target server will run out of
memory/resources, or cause a system crash.
Additionally, any stateful devices in the path between
the attacker and target will also be overwhelmed with
connection requests, possibly filling up the session table
on those devices if the SYN flood is not dealt with
effectively. Because SYN packets are normal and
necessary for TCP communication, a system cannot
simply drop all SYN packets as in the case of a “Ping of
Death” DoS attack, for example. SYN floods can be
mitigated effectively up to a certain point using a SYN
proxy feature in a stateful firewall. Above this rate, a
stateless screening router can be used to further limit
TCP-SYNs.
SYN Flood Protection: TCP SYN cookies SYN cookies
as a reaction to an attack
SYN cookies are a particular choice of the initial
sequence number.
The server generates the initial sequence number α
such as:
α= h (SSYN, DSYN, K)
SSYN: src address of the SYN packet
DSYN: address of the server
K: a secret key is a cryptographic hash function.
At arrival of the ACK message, the server calculates
again. Then, it verifies if the ack number is correct. If
yes, it assumes that the client has sent a SYN message
recently (considered as normal behavior), and allocates
memory.
B. SMURF
In a SMURF attack you can be affected in one of several
ways:
 As a victim or target of the attack
 As a network which is abused to amplify the
attack
 As a party harboring the instigator of the attack
SMURF and similar Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can
do serious damage to your network services, be it
either as an individual end-user or as an entire
institution in that your network or host can be
inundated with unwanted and maliciously sent traffic.
A SMURF attack (named after the program used to
perform the attack) is a method by which an attacker can
send a moderate amount of traffic and cause a virtual
explosion of traffic at the intended target. The method
used is as follows:
 The attacker sends ICMP Echo Request
packets where the source IP address has been
forged to be that of the target of the attack.
 The attacker sends these ICMP datagram’s to
addresses of remote LANs broadcast addresses,
using so-called directed broadcast addresses.
These datagram’s are thus broadcast out on the
LANs by the connected router.
 All the hosts which are «alive» on the LAN
each pick up a copy of the ICMP Echo Request
datagram (as they should), and sends an ICMP
Echo Reply datagram back to what they think
is the source. If many hosts are «alive» on the
LAN, the amplification factor can be
considerably (100+ is not uncommon).
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 The attacker can use largish packets (typically
up to Ethernet maximum) to increase the
«effectiveness» of the attack, and the faster
network connection the attacker has, the more
damage he can inflict on the target and the
target's network.
C . Preventing SMURF attacks
The availability of the directed broadcast function
is an important element in these attacks. The current
Proposed Standard for "Requirements for IP Version 4
Routers" states that a router must default to forwarding
directed broadcasts that a knob must exist to turn it off,
but it must default to the «on» position. However, the
current sentiment is that this should no longer be a
requirement. Thus, to prevent your network from being
abused as an amplifier network in a SMURF attack, you
should turn off the forwarding of directed broadcast on
all router ports or take other measures to assure your
network cannot be abused in this manner.
Another component which is important in this type
of attack is that the attacker has to be able to inject
packets into the network with forged IP source
addresses. It is possible to enable functions in routers
which will prevent the trivial forgery of IP source
addresses, and doing so for a local network will prevent
SMURF attacks from being launched locally. (Do
however note that access lists can have a performance
impact, so judicious use of such tools is advised.) This
sort of ingress filtering has been documented in
RFC2267, and is effective not only for preventing local
origination of SMURF attacks, and also makes tracking
attacks (or denying origination of attacks) much easier.
Since SMURF attacks use forged source addresses,
tracking SMURF attacks back to their source can be a
challenge. It has to be done while the attack is ongoing,
and requires the swift cooperation of all the network
service providers along the path. In practice this has
proven to be quite difficult.
D. TCP Connection Spoofing
This attack requires coordination of several attacks;
primarily denial-of-service of a trusted host, and packet
spoofing of the attack target. The DoS component can
be anything that prevents the trusted host from sending
reset packets to the target. One such means would be a
SYNflood. The other component requires sending
packets spoofed to be from the trusted host to the target.
Because of the DoS attack, the trusted host cannot reply
to packets received from the target, and the attacker can
cause the target to believe the packets are from the
trusted host. This will allow the attacker to use the target
as if it were the trusted host. This attack is made
difficult because TCP requires reply packets to include
the sequence number of the preceding packet. If the
attacker cannot directly observe the packets, it must
guess the sequence numbers. RFC 1948[6] provides
recommendations for increasing the difficulty of
predicting sequence numbers. Theoretically sequence
numbers could be made un guessable. However, while
more difficult than in the past, it is still possible and not
as difficult as is widely believed [12].
A common misconception is that "IP Spoofing" can be
used to hide your IP address while surfing the Internet,
chatting on-line, sending e-mail, and so forth.  This is
generally not true. Forging the source IP address causes
the responses to be misdirected, meaning you cannot
create a normal network connection. However, IP
spoofing is an integral part of many networks that do not
need to see responses.
III. Spoofed Packets Detection Methods
Detection methods can be classified as those requiring
router support, active host-based methods, passive host
based methods, and administrative methods.
Administrative methods are the most commonly used
methods today. When an attack is observed, security
personnel at the attacked site contact the security
personnel at the supposed attack site and ask for
corroboration. This is extremely inefficient and
generally fruitless. An automated method of determining
the whether packets are likely to have been spoofed is
clearly needed. This section describes a number of such
methods. If you monitor packets using network-
monitoring software such as netlog, look for a packet on
your external interface that has both its source and
destination IP addresses in your local domain. If you
find one, you are currently under attack. Another way to
detect IP spoofing is to compare the process accounting
logs between systems on your internal network. If the IP
spoofing attack has succeeded on one of your systems,
you may get a log entry on the victim machine showing
a remote access; on the apparent source machine, there
will be no corresponding entry for initiating that remote
access.
Source Address Validation:
 Check the source IP address of IP packets
 filter invalid source address
 filter close to the packets origin as
possible
 filter precisely as possible
 If no networks allow IP spoofing, we can
eliminate these kinds of attacks.
 We can check and drop the packets which have
unused address everywhere, but used space can
be checked before aggregation.
A. Prevention IP spoofing
The best method of preventing the IP spoofing problem
is to install a filtering router that restricts the input to
your external interface (known as an input filter) by not
allowing a packet through if it has a source address from
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your internal network. In addition, you should filter
outgoing packets that have a source address different
from your internal network in order to prevent a source
IP spoofing attack originating from your site.  If your
vendor’s router does not support filtering on the inbound
side of the interface or if there will be a delay in
incorporating the feature into your system, you may
filter the spoofed IP packets by using a second router
between your external interface and your outside
connection. Configure this router to block, on the
outgoing interface connected to your original router, all
packets that have a source address in your internal
network. To prevent IP spoofing happen in your
network, the following are some common practices:
1- Avoid using the source address authentication.
Implement cryptographic authentication system-wide.
2- Configuring your network to reject packets from the
Net that claim to originate from a local address.
3- Implementing ingress and egress filtering on the
border routers and implement an ACL (access control
list) that blocks private IP addresses on your
downstream interface. If you allow outside connections
from trusted hosts, enable encryption sessions at the
router.
B . Routing methods
Because routers (or IP level switches) can know which
IP addresses originate with which network interface, it is
possible for them to identify packets that should not
have been received by a particular interface. For
example, a border router or gateway will know whether
addresses are internal to the network or external. If the
router receives IP packets with external IP addresses on
an internal interface, or it receives IP packets with an
internal IP address on an external interface, the packet
source is most likely spoofed. In the wake of recent
denial-of-service attacks involving spoofed attack
packets, ISPs and other network operators have been
urged to filter packets using the above-described
method. Filtering inbound packets, known as ingress
filtering, protects the organization from outside attacks.
Similarly, filtering outbound packets prevents internal
computers from being involved in spoofing attacks.
Such filtering is known as egress filtering. It is
interesting to note that if all routers were configured to
use ingress and/or egress filtering, attacks would be
limited to those staged within an organization or require
an attacker to subvert a router. Internal routers with a
strong notion of inside/outside can also detect spoofed
packets. However, certain network topologies may
contain redundant routes making this distinction unclear.
In these cases, host based methods can be used at the
router. A number of IP addresses are reserved by the
IANA for special purposes. These are listed in table 1.
The addresses in the first group are private addresses
and should not be routed beyond a local network. Seeing
these on an outside interface may indicate spoofed
packets. Depending on the particular site, seeing these
on an internal address would also be suspicious. The
other addresses in table 1 are special purpose, local only
addresses and should never be seen on an outer
interface. Many firewalls look for the packets described
in this section. Typically they are dropped when
received. Because firewalls have been a popular security
product, research into routing methods has been active.
Most all research has been in this area. Routers can also
take a more active role in detecting spoofed packets. A
number of advanced router projects have dealt with this
and spoofed packet traceback method[17].
There are several IP addresses that are special in one
way or another. These addresses are for special purposes
or are to be put to special use.
 Addresses significant to every IP subnet
o Network Address
o Broadcast Address
 Addresses significant to individual hosts
o Loop back Address
 Special Addresses of Global Significance
o Private Addresses
o Reserved Addresses
We have proposed a number of proactive methods that
can be used to detect and prevent spoofed packets. One
limitation of routing methods is that they are effective
only when packets pass through them. An attacker on
the same subnet as the target could still spoof packets.
When the attacker is on the same Ethernet subnet as the
target, both the source IP address and the Ethernet MAC
would be spoofed. If the spoofed source address was an
external address, the MAC would be that of the router.
This implies that other techniques are required.
Spoofed packet detection can be implemented as either
an IDS sensor or as a firewall process. As a sensor,
packets believed to have spoofed source addresses will
generate alerts for use by the IDS. Used in a firewall, the
packets can be dropped or passed but flagged as
possibly spoofed. Security monitoring systems could
use this in detecting attacks. A robust and efficient
spoofed packet detection process should use a
combination of methods to make its determinations. The
system we are constructing first determines if the packet
is suspicious using passive techniques then active
probes to corroborate the passive detectors prediction. A
number of different probes are used to determine if the
packet was spoofed. If the probes indicate the packet is
not spoofed, the system will update the static classifier
International Journal of Science Engineering and AdvanceTechnology, IJSEAT, Vol1, Issue 3, August - 2013 ISSN 2321-6905
www.ijseat.com Page 43
to include the new values. Although updating the
detector could incorporate router attacks as valid packet
sources, it also allows us to learn more of the existing
network relations. While it is possible to check all
packets, for efficiency we see these methods being most
useful as an on-demand adjunct to primary IDS.
IV. FIGURES AND TABLES
TABLE I. Table of Words
Address Used for Reference
10.0.0.0 Private-Use Networks RFC 1918
14.0.0.0 Public-Data Network RFC1700
127.0.0.0 Loopback address RFC1700
169.254.0.0 Link Local RFC 3927
224.0.0.0 Multicast RFC3171
Fig. 1. Packet moving in the internet.
Fig2. Establishing half-open connections to a node.
Fig3. Generates the initial sequence number
Conclusion
The original motivation for this research was our work
in model based intrusion detection [29]. At issue was a
lack of sensors to provide needed information to support
correlation of events. Generally, these sensors required
inferring something not directly in an observed packet.
Some examples include, are attack packets are from the
same attacker, was an attack successful, is a sniffer
present, and if a packet was spoofed. We quickly found
that such sensors are possible and could be used to
support IDS. Furthermore, while investigating
commercial IDSs, we observed that many of the alerts
generated were false positives and could be eliminated if
corroborating information were available. The ability to
know if the packets that generated the alerts were
spoofed is just one example of supplemental
information that would help in filtering out those alerts
of low significance. The utility of detecting spoofed
packets extends beyond simple detection and
assessment. When used at a firewall to detect and block
spoofed packets, the discussed techniques can be used to
prevent spoofed packet attacks.
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